Rankings games

Research rankings based on publications and citations today dominate governance of academia. Yet they have unintended side effects on individual scholars and academic institutions and can be counterproductive. They induce a substitution of the “taste for science” by a “taste for publication”. We suggest as alternatives careful selection and socialization of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. Neither should rankings be a basis for the distributions of funds within universities. Rather, qualified individual scholars should be supported by basic funds to be able to engage in new and unconventional research topics and methods.Academic governance, rankings, motivation, selection, socialization

Research Governance in Academia: Are there Alternatives to Academic Rankings?

Peer reviews and rankings today are the backbone of research governance, but recently came under scrutiny. They take explicitly or implicitly agency theory as a theoretical basis. The emerging psychological economics opens a new perspective. As scholarly research is a mainly curiosity driven endeavor, we include intrinsic motivation and supportive feedback by the peers as important determinants of scholarly behavior. We discuss whether a stronger emphasis on selection and socialization offers an alternative to the present regime of academic rankings.peer reviews, rankings, research governance, agency theory, psychological economics, new public management, economics of science, control theory

Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors

The most influential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders' supremacy does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder' interests by making the board more responsible to shareholders, and monitoring of top management by independent outside directors should be strengthened. Corporate governance reform needs to go in another direction altogether. Firm-specific knowledge investments are, like financial investments, not ex ante contractible, leaving investors open to exploitation by shareholders. Employees therefore refuse to make firm-specific investments. To gain a sustainable competitive advantage, there must be an incentive to undertake such firm-specific investments. Three proposals are advanced to deal with this dilemma: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. (2) The insiders should be elected by those employees of the firm who are making firm-specific knowledge investments. (3) The board should be chaired by a neutral person. These proposals have major advantages: they provide incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they encourage intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the firm by strengthening distributive and procedural justice, and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. These proposals for reforming the board may help to overcome the crisis corporate governance is in. At the same time, they provide a step in the direction of a more adequate theory of the firm as a basis for corporate governanc

Fusionen und Übernahmen im Licht der Hybris - Überblick über den Forschungsstand

Zusammenfassung: Eine hohe Anzahl von Fusionen und Übernahmen scheitert. Gleichwohl sind Fusionen und Übernahmen an der Tagesordnung. Als eine Erklärung hierfür wird die Hybris-Hypothese diskutiert, d.h. die These, dass sich Entscheidungsträger der aufnehmenden Unternehmen systematisch überschätzen. Um diese These zu testen und um gegebenenfalls Maßnahmen gegen Hybris zu ergreifen, sind verlässliche Indikatoren für Hybris erforderlich. Die Arbeit stellt die in der Literatur entwickelten Indikatoren vor und diskutiert deren Vor- und Nachteil

Do synergies exist in related acquisitions? A meta-analysis of acquisition studies

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) aim to increase the wealth of shareholders of the acquiring company, in particular by creating synergies. It is often assumed that relatedness is a source of synergies. Our study distinguishes between business, cultural, technological, and size relatedness. It discusses the reasons why these different forms of relatedness can lead to an acquisition success and we conduct a meta-analysis of 67 prior M&A studies. Results indicate that positive effects can be expected under specific conditions only and have a limited overall impact on acquisition success. A moderator analysis finds that synergies stemming from relatedness depend on industry-, country-, and investor-characteristic

Pay for Performance in the Public Sector—Benefits and (Hidden) Costs

Current reforms in the public sector are characterized by the introduction of businesslike incentive structures, in particular the introduction of "pay for performance” schemes in public institutions. However, the public sector has some specific characteristics, which might restrict the naive adoption of pay for performance. Our article analyzes whether the impact of pay for performance on performance is bound to conditions, and if this is the case, under which conditions pay for performance has a positive or a negative effect on performance. We explore this contingency in a meta-analytic review of previous experimental studies on the effects of pay for performance on performance. We further show why pay for performance sometimes negatively affects personal efforts. With an experimental vignette study we demonstrate (a) that motivation is likely to be a key influence on the effect of performance-related pay on performance, and (b) that pay for performance is generally more costly as it appears because it almost always produces hidden costs of rewards. Our findings help to explain the modest success of pay for performance in the public secto

Focal random selection closes the gender gap in competitiveness

Gender differences in choosing to enter competitions are an important cause of the leaky pipeline for women in leadership roles and represent a considerable waste of human resources. We used an incentivized laboratory experiment to evaluate whether the introduction of random elements alters the gender gap in competitiveness. We found that focal random selection from a preselected pool removes the difference in competitiveness between men and women and does not dilute the qualifications of the entrants. The percentage of women who took part in competitions was nearly triple, and that of high-ability women double, with focal random selection compared to selection in pure performance competitions. In contrast, the behavior of men remained largely unchanged. Focal random selection closes the gender gap in competitiveness and can substantially enlarge the pool of high-performing women who apply for top jobs